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A.B.A. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: IN
DEFENSE OF MEDIOCRITY'
HAROLD BROWN

AFTER

FIVE YEARS

of toiling, with three meetings each month, a dis-

tinguished committee of the ABA has conceptualized the first
general revision of the Canons in this century, including a complete set
of Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules.
Since the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility by
the ABA in August, 1969, to become effective January 1, 1970, three
minor amendments were approved in 1970. Although the Code is technically binding only on members of the ABA, it has already been enacted
in twelve states and is actively under consideration in numerous jurisdictions.'

This article is reprinted from Trial Magazine.
1 As of June 15, 1970, of the 12 states that have adopted the Code as the standard

governing the practice of law to date, the following states have adopted it without
change: New Hampshire, Maine, New York, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, Arkansas and
Oklahoma. The following states have adopted it with certain amendments: Illinois,
Wisconsin, Nebraska, Kansas and Colorado.
In Nebraska the only change that was made in adopting the Code was that
it was adopted without DR2-103(D) (5), which was referred to the State Judicial
Council for further study. In Kansas the Code was adopted without change, except
that the Ethical Considerations were approved in principle rather than adopted.
In the following states the Code has been approved by the state bar association without change, and a recommendation for adoption has been made to the
State Supreme Court: Vermont, Connecticut, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Ohio,
Indiana and Minnesota.
In the following states the Code has been approved by the state bar association
with certain changes and has been recommended for adoption to the State Supreme
Court: 1District of Columbia, Virginia, Florida and Arizona.
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Because of the sweeping changes proposed by the new Code, every attorney
has an obligation to familiarize himself
with its terms, not only as a mattter of selfinterest, but for the benefit of the profession itself and the society it serves.
At the same time, in spite of its prestigious credentials, the Code is fairly subject
to critical appraisal as a whole and in its
detailed provisions. While some bar associations may mistakenly gloss over the
proposal in brief hearings before unrepresentative committees, it should be emphasized that much more is demanded since
the adoption of the Code by court decree
will have the effect of binding legislation.
As such, the judiciary should first afford
the widest latitude to analysis and criticism
by every member of the bar and by bar associations.
It would indeed be difficult to quarrel
with the platitudes in the newly stated Canons, themselves, each of which simply describes a noble goal, namely:
Canon 1: "A Lawyer Should Assist in
Maintaining the Integrity and Competence
of the Legal Profession."
Canon 2: "A Lawyer Should Assist the
Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty to
Make Legal Counsel Available."
Canon 3: "A Lawyer Should Assist in
Preventing the Unauthorized Practice of
Law."
Canon 4: "A Lawyer Should Preserve
the Confidences and Secrets of a Client."
Canon 5: "A Lawyer Should Exercise
Independent Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client."

Canon 6: "A Lawyer Should Represent
a Client Competently."
Canon 7: "A Lawyer Should Represent
a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of
the Law."
Canon 8: "A Lawyer Should Assist in
Improving the Legal System."
Canon 9: "A Lawyer Should Avoid Even
the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."
Each of the Canons is then followed by
a series of "Ethical Considerations" consisting of numbered paragraphs with discursive exposition of the generalties stated
in the respective Canon. Then follow the
"Disciplinary Rules" themselves, which
speak in statutory form and obviously lay
the basis for judicial review of professional
misconduct, with a view toward censure,
suspension, or even disbarment for their
violation.
Perhaps most significantly, there are no
procedural provisions to indicate the manner in which the Canons may be implemented, the forum to which resort may be
had, and the provisions for judicial review,
if any.
Maybe it was intended that each state
should adopt its own procedures, whether
directly or indirectly through statewide or
local bar associations, the Attorney General, distirct attorneys, special court proceedings, or by the highest court of each
state.
As will be seen, the substantive features
of the "Disciplinary Rules" are such as to
make the procedural matters of crucial importance. Significantly, in states which
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have adopted the "Unified Bar," of which
there are already over 30 and more are
in the offing, it is conceivable that matters
of discipline may well repose in completely
nonjudicial, as well as nongovernmental,
forums.
A copy of the entire Code, including the
Canons, the Ethical Considerations, the
Disciplinary Rules, and lengthy annotations, consisting of 48 pages in all, can be
obtained directly from the ABA in Chicago or quite possibly from various state
bar associations.
Although it would hardly be feasible to
review all of the Code in this article, it
should be stressed that much of its content
deserves the staunch support of every
member of the bar. The criticism contained
in this report should therefore be considered specific, rather than as a broad attack
on the Code in its entirety. Such individual
matters nevertheless raise such serious
questions of morality and judgment that
without major revisions, the Code is not to
be commended for adoption.
Spying on Brother Counsel
In support of Canon 1, it is broadly
stated that a lawyer shall not "Violate a
Disciplinary Rule" (DRI-102(A) (1)).
Having thus incorporated all of the extensive Disciplinary Rules by reference, it is
then ordered that:
"A lawyer possessing unprivileged
knowledge of a violation . . .shall report
such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act
upon such violation" (DR1-103(A)).
Although the rule is limited to "unpriv-

CATHOLIC

LAWYER,

AUTUMN

1970

ileged information," it nevertheless adopts
an affirmative duty of reporting all "knowledge of a violation," any neglect of which
will in itself subject the nonreporter to the
discipline of the Code.
Perhaps for the first time in the annals
of Anglo-American jurisprudence, there
would thus be enacted a true "Gestapo"
informer system, with each attorney legally
bound to police his brother attorney. Such
a rule would go far beyond the bounds of
"guilt by association," since there is no
limit as to the source of such "knowledge,"
so long as it emanates from "unprivileged
information."
For example, a later rule provides penalties for the negligent practice of law
(DR6-101(A)(1)-(3)), to be discussed
further below. Apparently, if an attorney
observes the incompetent argument of a
motion or trial of a case while innocently
sitting in a courtroom waiting for his own
matter to be reached, it will be incumbent
upon him to volunteer a full report of the
"knowledge" so obtained, since failure to
report will subject the observer to disciplinary action.
While such a risk can be discreetl)
avoided by remaining in the courtroom
corridor, such a burden cannot be escaped
when it is based on observations made during the negotiation of a lease or other contractual matter in which one's opponent
apparently displays a lack of "competence."
And since one must be certain to report
accurately, hereafter the attorney should
make a double set of notes, one on the
matter at hand, the other on the conduct
of one's opponent, since the reporting at-
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torney should be careful to maintain his
standing as a grade-A spy. Inefficient reporting of such incompetence may in itself
constitute negligence.
Since such obligations of an "official informer" are based on all of the Disciplinary
Rules, several of which will be discussed
below, every attorney would be well advised to study the Rules meticulously, since
it will surely be held that every attorney is
"presumed to know the law," both as a
prime offender and as a nonreporter of violations by others. Short of committing all
the Rules to memory, at the very least,
copies should be carried in one's brief case.
Before leaving the objective consideration of this Rule, it may also be asked
whether it is a violation for Attorney A to
fail to report that Attorney B failed to inform on Attorney C. After all, the standard
of conduct now requires that Attorney B
fulfill his obligations as an informer.
On the other hand, it is quite possible
that such an extension of one's prime obligation as an informer, does not require an
investigation as to whether Attorney B
actually filed a report.
It would, however, appear the better part
of discretion at least to list the names and
addresses of all the other attorneys in the
courtroom who observed the incompetence
of Attorney A, though it is not quite clear
as to whether this protective measure
should be adopted prior to the observation
of Attorney A's incompetent conduct.
Because of the general unfamiliarity of
so many attorneys with the intricacies of
"information," it might also be helpful to
request a report from some with direct ex-

perience in such roles under the Nazi regime, some of whom might be willing to
expostulate, albeit anonymously.
A somewhat less efficient source of instruction would be recent college graduates whose experience with "Honor Codes"
included similar reporting obligations. After all, every effort should be made to help
attorneys to learn how to avoid "conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice" (DR1-102(A)(5)), and "even
minor violations of law by a lawyer may
tend to lessen public confidence in the legal
profession" (EC 1-5).
As previously adumbrated, perhaps the
most interesting innovation is the command that a lawyer shall not "neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him" (DR6-101
(A)(3)). In disarmingly simple language, the Rule would now expose all
counsel not merely to civil liability for neglect, nor the salutary requirement of adequate insurace to cover professional
liability, but now as well to the risk of disbarment.
The hurried conveyancer who overlooks
a last minute real estate attachment can no
longer find solace in prompt coverage from
his personal funds, particularly since the
negligence must be reported by the attorney for the attaching creditor, lest the
latter himself be in violation.
The commercial practitioner had best
become aware that many bankrupt estates
are potential claimants under the Antitrust
Laws and that overlooking the filing of
such a claim could lead to counsel's disbarment. Though the degree of the negligence
could mitigate the punishment, the Rule itself would brook no exceptions.
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Determining Competence
Lest such threat be narrowly construed,
the companion Rule specifies that a lawyer shall not:
"Handle a legal matter which he knows
or should know that he is not competent
to handle, without associating with him a
lawyer who is competent to handle it"
(DR6-101 (A) (1)).
Under this Rule, it would be no defense
that the matter was successfully concluded
without negligence.
There are, of course, some other pitfalls
in the Rule, such as the unspecified standards for "competence," not merely in the
attorney's self-analysis, but also in that of
selecting an associate.
Since "competence" must depend on the
difficulty of the client's problem, presumably young attorneys will of necessity
spend much time seeking confirmation of
their competence and even more to canvass
experienced attorneys until they find one
of sufficient self-assurance to gamble on
his own competence.
Presumably "competence" will be considered in the dynamic sense, not merely
in the attorney's static ability. The skill of
a neophyte willing to make a thorough research of the law as well as an exhaustive
analysis of the facts, may have to be balanced against that of the leader of the Bar
who may first receive the case the night before trial with an investigator's sloppily
prepared file. On the other hand, such a
liberal interpretation may not be feasible
if "competence" is to be judged in the
abstract, as in some Orwellian concept of
every attorney's capabilities.
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Finally, the Rules would specifically preclude any contractual provision for exoneration (DR6-102(A)), so that no matter
how enthusiastic or confident the client
may be, and no matter how insistently he
may want the particular attorney, the matter must boldly decline to accept the engagement if any lurking doubt exists.
Such limitation on exoneration should
be contrasted with the customary limitations provided in many formal trusts, particularly where a bank or similar institution assumes fiduciary obligations.
Although such full-blown trustees usually require exoneration except for willful
neglect or fraudulent self-preference, the
attorney who might so provide would
thereby violate a Rule, even the "attempt"
at exoneration being proscribed.
The supposed justification for these
Rules is even more revealing. In one of
the Notes, great reliance is placed on the
fact that with "concentration within a limited field, the greater the proficiency and
expertness that can be developed," quoting
from the Report of the Special Committee
on Specialization and Specialized Legal
Education, 79 A.B.A. Rep. 582, 588
(1954). Such a thrice "special" pronouncement would appear difficult to contest, were it not for the fact that a general
disenchantment with the merits of specialization has at last begun to reach not only
the legal, but the Medical profession as
well. But while general practitioners are
content to let specialists live in their own
rarefied atmosphere, apparently the specialists have now decided to pre-empt the
entire field.
The nonsequitur in the final justification
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for this Rule apparently escaped the editorial committee when it simply quoted
figures from the Annual Report of the
Committee on Grievances of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
(N.Y.L.J. Sept. 12, 1968, at 4, col. 5),
to the effect that "of the 828 offenses
against clients,... 452, or more than half
of all such offenses, involved (sic) neglect."
Obviously, that simple quotation from
a newspaper summary, justifies the outlawing of "neglect" and the ostracism of
any attorney guilty of such conduct.
Whether such "neglect" was aggravated or
consisted of excusable oversight, will never
be known. Nor does the Rule permit any
such distinction.
It is as revealing as another blind conclusion to the effect that "If the attorney
is not competent to skillfully and properly
perform the work, he should not undertake the service," citing a civil liability
case, not a disbarment proceeding (Degen
v. Steinbrink, 202 App. Div. 477, 481, 195
N.Y.S. 810, 814 (1922), aff'd mem. 236
N.Y. 669, 142 N.E. 328 (1923).
Rather than pursue this inquiry into the
competence of the reporters or their obvious preference for the specialist, almost
necessarily one associated with a large law
firm, it would appear perfectly clear that
the Rules on "competence" are completely
unworkable, excessively harsh, and ill-designed to accomplish the obviously desirable goal that "A lawyer should represent
a client competently" (Canon 6). Perhaps
a few comments by an experienced general
practitioner may broaden the scope of inquiry.

Empirically it may be assumed that perhaps 90% or more of all attorneys would
classify themselves as general practitioners,
perhaps by choice and possibly to reflect
the nature of the legal services most generally required in the broad stretches of the
nation.
But even in the urban centers where
large firms abound with a plethora of specialists, it has become quite obvious that
the absence of correlation of such services
is a serious problem, compounded by the
fact that the availability of such services
is severely restricted by the financial limitations of most clients.
If this would appear to be a defense of
mediocrity, let it be known that in each
attorney's sphere of activity, there may
well be the finest sense of accomplishment
and professionally rendered service.
Perhaps there are other avenues for
achieving the goal without categorizing
questions of competence as "disbarrable
offenses." Commencing with higher standards in the law schools or even a radical
revamping of curricula, one might more
closely examine the standards for admission to the Bar and even consider a more
general requirement of clerkships after
admission.
Perhaps lawyers should be encouraged
to emulate the medical profession where
it is customary for the experienced and
specialized to donate a substantial portion
of their time to instruct and assist neophytes (Canon 1).
Rather than rely on the secret and privately administered rating system of the
leading law list-with extensive advertising
allowed by those who somehow achieve
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such ratings (See DR2-102(A)(6))thought might be given to establishing
community acknowledgement of professional achievement in plans administered
on a purely objective basis by bar associations or even governmental authority.
For example, in England, law lists are
severely restricted with regard to ratings,
advertising, and exclusiveness in their listings; it is the government which designates
outstanding members of the Bar as
"Queen's Ccunsel."
The encouragement
of excellence
through appropriate incentives would enhance the image of the Bar and increase
its capacity to serve the community.
Such a constructive approach should be
contrasted not only with the capital threat
of disbarment and the demoralization of a
Bar compelled to inform on itself, but also
with the very practical outcome that every
disgruntled client would have immediate
power to blackmail his attorney on fee
matters no matter how fairly established
or willingly paid in advance. With 50% of
most litigants losing their cases, the extent
of disappointment may easily turn to wrath
for counsel's supposed incompetence.
Nor can there be ignored the direct effect of the "spying" and "competence"
Rules on fee matters in general. Depending
on the general incompetence of the Bar in
the particular locality, the self-appointed
competent attorney may well have to contemplate the loss of as much as 10% of
his available hours spent in observing, documenting, reporting, and testifying against
brother counsel.
The incompetent attorney will have to
allocate from 10% to 20% of his time to
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defending against charges of incompetence,
seeking out competent associate counsel,
and careful study designed to eliminate his
own incompetence. Such resulting loss of
income must therefore be considered in the
light of the Rules on the subject of fees
(DR2-106-107).
I

Fees

The principal fiat on fees is the prohibition of an agreement, charge, or collection
of "an illegal or clearly excessive fee"
(DR2-106(A)), the existence of which
would be found when "a lawyer of ordinary (sic) prudence would be left with
a definite and firm conviction that the fee
is in excess of a reasonable fee" (DR2106(B)).
Because numerous state and local bar
associations also provide minimum fee
schedules, the Rule should be considered
in the light of such local arrangements.
Contrary to the advice of the ABA under
the previous Canon 12 that such "minimum fee schedules can only be suggested
or recommended and cannot be made obligatory" (ABA Opinion 302 (1961)),
many pressures undoubtedly are exerted
to enforce such schedules, particularly in
the 30 or more states which have adopted
the "Unified Bar."
Ethical considerations aside, all of such
measures concerning minimum or maximum fees must be considered in the light
of the letter, as well as the spirit of, the
federal Antitrust Laws and various state
statutes of similar import.
Under the federal statute, both minimum (U.S. v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29 (1960)' and maximum (Albrecht
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v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968))
price maintenance constitutes a per se violation. Wherever attorneys have subscribed
to such schedules, there is an express "contract, combination, or conspiracy" in restraint of trade (15 U.S.C. 1).
Although the violation is even stronger
where attorneys are subject to reprimand
or censure for infractions, as to price-fixing
violations, the Supreme Court has also cast
doubt on the mildest arrangements by
condemning "consciously parallel action"
(American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S.
781 (1945); Milgram v. Loew's, Inc.,
(3rd Cir 1951) 192 F.2d 579, cert. den.
343 U.S. 929).
Apparently unimpressed by either ethical or economic considerations, the government has recently instituted injunctive
suit against a real estate brokers' association and its members where the latter
agreed not to accept multiple listings except at the "recommended" commission
rates (Prince George's County Board of
Realtors, Inc. 1969 Trade Cases 45,069).
Aside from the minimum fee schedules
of local associations, the ABA Code not
only prohibits "clearly excessive fees," but
affirmatively requires the policing of such
maximum fees by all other attorneys
(DRI-103 (A)).
There is no known or readily suggested
basis for exempting legal services from the
impact of the Antitrust Laws. Although
some may suggest that many legal matters
do not come within the "flow of interstate
commerce" now used as the jurisdictional
test for the federal statute, such would
hardly appear true for most corporate and
commercial transactions.

Even as to wholly intrastate matters,
many states have adopted their own Antitrust Laws either directly or through enactment of a so-called "Baby" F.T.C. Act
(e.g. Mass. G. L. (Ter. Ed.) Ch. 93A).
Although the antitrust law adopted in
1970 by New Jersey would specifically
exempt nonprofit associations in recommending fee schedules as guidelines (1970
T.C. 33,301), neither such action nor state
adoption of the ABA Code would provide
exemption from the federal statute.
Rather than quibble as to the applicability of such anticompetitive regulations,
it would seem that of all businessmen, the
legal community should do all in its power
to "avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety," in the exact words of
Canon 9. Perhaps the draftsmen of the
Canons will excuse this possible impugning of their competence under Canens 6
and 9, since it would appear obligatory
under Canon 1 and DR1-103 (A).
Perhaps the other most salient fee matter in the Code is its prohibition of referral
fees among lawyers even though the client
consents after full disclosure and the total
fee does not clearly exceed reasonable
compensation (DR2-107(A)(1)-(3)).
Since the rule would permit the division
of fees only "in proportion of the services
performed and responsibility assumed by
each" attorney, at the very least it must be
recognized as a radical departure from
widespread custom of long duration.
Even if the Code is not adopted in a
particular jurisdiction, forwarding counsel
would do well to avoid entrapment either
under the aegis of the ABA or in the state
of the receiving attorney where such a
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provision of the Code may have been
adopted.
There may, of course, be some question
as to whether this entire provision constitutes undue meddling, at least where the
client knowledgeably consents and the total fee is reasonable. This is particularly
crucial among many trial counsel whose
practice consists primarily of referral work.
Such specialists have become increasingly necessary because of the notorious
contraction in the number of able trial advocates. Limiting the division of fees in
"proportion to the services performed and
responsibility assumed by each" would
necessarily be a matter of hindsight, would
complicate the negotiations after the fact,
and would compound the business aspects
by the ethical considerations introduced
by the Code.
Disclosure of Client's Fraud
Serious questions are also inherent in the
rule concerning representation of a client
within the bounds of the law, with regard
to the disclosure of a client's fraud on a
person or tribunal (DR7-102(B)(I)).
Under that Rule, a lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
"His client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon
a person or tribunal shall promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if
his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal." (Ibid; underscoring supplied.)
It would appear that the underscored
portion of the Rule creates an affirmative
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duty of disclosure with problems akin to
those requiring that an attorney report any
violation of the Rules by another attorney.
Aside from the fact that an attorney's
duties as an "informer" relate to a client's
fraud, as compared with a brother attorney's negligence, even "fraud" is such an
all-encompassing term that one may question if, in fact, society's welfare requires
such policing of a client by his own attorney.
By contrast, it may be recalled that large
segments of the Bar voiced grave protest
when the director of the FBI suggested
that attorneys had such an affirmative duty
to a client's conduct of a treasonous nature.
Weighing such a new principle against
the well-established doctrine of absolute
confidence between client and attorney, it
is to be doubted that such a drastic remedy
should be required even in case of a
serious fraud.
There will be many who would suggest
that, at most, an attorney's duty at that
juncture would call for his termination of
representation, lest he become a participant in the fraud. Even so, it might then
be asked whether the proposed rule would
not effectively bar a fraudulent client from
obtaining competent legal services. (Cf.
Canon 2 regarding the duty to "make legal
counsel available.")
At the very least, clients would be entitled to a .forthright declaration of such a
stringent rule prior to their entrapment by
the only expert whom society has provided
for confidential disclosure and advice.
Although some may differ, a balancing
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of such considerations would appear to
indicate that this Rule has exceeded the
fair limits of ethical conduct.
Services for the Middle Class
Finally, in the broadest frame of reference, the drafters of the code have seemingly sought to legislate on a matter of
grave importance to society as a whole,
namely the means of providing efficient
and reasonably priced legal services for
the great majorities in the middle class.
While taking cognizance of the fact that
the wealthy are well represented and that
direct or indirect provision of services for
the needy are laudable, the Rules would
severely restrict a lawyer's participation in
offices or organizations designed to provide
legal services for its members (DR2-103
(D)).
While excepting from the prohibition
such offices as legal aid, public defender,
military legal assistance, and bar association referral services, the crucial exception
for the general public would hew as closely
as possible to the exemption allowed by
the Supreme Court in a series of recent
cases involving the provision by labor
unions or certain social service organizations of free personal legal services for its
members. (United Mine Workers v. Ill.
State Bar Association, 389 U.S. 217, 19
L. Ed. 2d 426, 88 S. Ct. 353 (1967);
Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 371 U.S. 1, 12 L. Ed. 2d 89, 84
S. Ct. 1113 (1964); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, 83 S. Ct.
328 (1963)).
The narrow scope of this permitted exception is most evident in the severity of

the condition that such activity will be
allowed:
"Only in those instances and to the extent that controlling constitutional interpretation at the time of the rendition of
the services requires the allowance of such
legal service, and only if the following
conditions, unless prohibited by such interpretation, are met:
a. The primary purposes of such organization do not include the rendition of
legal services.
b. The recommending, furnishing, or
paying for legal services to its members is
incidental and reasonably related to the
primary purposes of such organization.
c. Such organization does not derive a
financial benefit from the rendition of legal
services by the lawyer.
d. The member or beneficiary for whom
the legal services are rendered, and not
such organization, is recognized as the
client of the lawyer in that matter. (DR2103(D) (5))."
Such begrudging concessions to the
Constitution, itself, limited to the interpretation in effect at the time of the rendering of the legal services and with the
clearly implicit hope of a narrowing of the
doctrines already enunciated, reflect a bare
bones approach that would shame a carrion.
Not content with the severity of the selfinterest evident in the general statement of
the Rule, the drafters sought to foreclose
any seepage by providing the four additional conditions.
It is, indeed, difficult to escape the im-
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pression that, given the power, the ABA
would have reversed the Supreme Court,
heedless of the broad social implications
of the Court's rulings in this highly sensitive area.
For it is obvious that aside from services
for the wealthy and possibly the poor, it is
the broad spectrum of middle America
which has been economically foreclosed
from reasonable access to competent legal
services of a general practitioner, let alone
the services of the specialist given such
deference in Rule DR6-101(A)(1), discussed above.
In a society of ever increasing sophistication, it is distressing to note that except
in such necessary circumstances as a criminal charge, an auto tort, conveyance, or
an estate, tens of millions never see a law
office in their life-time.
Persons with annual incomes of $7,500
to $20,000, probably with a wife and two
or more children headed for college, can
hardly afford cash fees of $500 or more,
frequently the minimum requirement for
competent advice even on business matters
with limited complications.
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sion, lawyers might well find a severe
shortage of counsel to meet the demands
of such tens of millions of new clients.
One may also speculate that from a
completely selfish viewpoint, the rapid
growth of the custom of having salaried
corporate counsel, may presage far more
financial damage to independent practitioners, yet no murmur has been heard on
that front.
The basic criticism of the Rule lies in
its foreclosure of discussion and debate by
all of society, comparable to that which
occurred in recent efforts to solve similar
medical cost problems. The almost unheralded adoption of the Rules by the
ABA and already by 12 states, undoubtedly with many more to come, would become legally binding except for Congressional action or a constitutional ruling by
the Supreme Court. It may well be asked
whether such conduct by the Bar constitutes a per se violation of Canon 9, requiring that:
"A Lawyer Should Avoid Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety."

Quite possibly, this economic problem
may require a restructuring of established
patterns, ranging from extended credit
plans, prepayment insurance programs, or
even legal clinics supported in whole or
in part by governmental funds.

Although this discussion has been confined to some of the more controversial
provisions of the new Code, to large segments of the Bar there would appear ample
justification for vigorous action to defeat
its adoption and certainly to subject it to
drastic amendment. But much more would
seem to be involved.

It can hardly be thought that the need
of such citizens for legal services, is any
the less than that of the labor union members covered by the Supreme Court decisions. And rather than panic at the thought
of such an imagined threat to the profes-

While proponents of the Code might
consider this exposition little more than a
defense of mediocrity, the illustrations intended to highlight the deficiencies of the
Code were in defense of tenets fundamental to the protection of a free society.
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Though few could quarrel with the
Canons, themselves, their implementation
in the Disciplinary Rules demonstrates
such insensitivity to the basic rights of both
attorney and client, that many will demand
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a total revision. For those who may now
or hereafter be subject to such rules of
conduct, this discussion will have served
a useful purpose if only to make them
aware of its Draconian concepts.

